Takeaways
In 2025, we recruited participants from past focus groups to dive deeper into their lived experiences, political opinions, and to track how they were experiencing the Trump administration. Our participants were mainly Biden defectors (and one non-voter who leaned Trump), meaning they had voted for Biden in the past but had voted for Trump in 2024. Our participants were Philip (9/25- 2/26), Andres (7/25-2/26), Lorena (6/25-2/26), and Juan (9/25-2/26).
At the beginning of the study, participants largely framed their 2024 vote through a lens of economic frustration, dissatisfaction with Democrats, and a belief that Trump represented strength, order, and a return to stability. Many expressed conservative-leaning views on immigration, cultural issues, and government spending, even when those views conflicted with their personal experiences as immigrants.
By the end of the study, while most participants still leaned right, their views had become more nuanced and conflicted. Some expressed disappointment that Trump had not delivered meaningful economic relief, and many voiced growing discomfort with the tone of politics and the consequences of harsh immigration rhetoric.
The Economy: Inflation as the “New Normal,” and the Feeling of Falling Behind
Across ethnographies, participants consistently named the economy as the top driver of their political decision-making—and the clearest explanation for why some chose Trump over Harris in 2024, a departure from supporting Democrats in the past. For many, the economy functioned less as an abstract policy debate and more as a daily-life lens: the price of groceries, rent, gas, childcare, and basic bills became the primary way they evaluated leadership, competence, and trustworthiness. Participants talked about politics through the language of personal survival—whether their paycheck could stretch far enough, whether they felt they were falling behind, and whether their hard work was still paying off.
But by mid 2025 and into 2026, the same economic lens that pushed participants toward Trump has begun to generate frustration, disappointment, and in some cases regret over their vote. In 2024, that economic lens pushed many participants toward Trump because they associated him with a time when life felt more affordable, wages went further, and financial pressure felt less constant. Even when participants disagreed with Trump on immigration or disliked his personality, they often described their vote as a practical choice rooted in economic urgency: they wanted relief, stability, and someone they believed would “fix” inflation and restore opportunity.
In nearly every interview, participants described inflation as the dominant force shaping their lives and outlook. Many framed rising costs not as a temporary disruption, but as something permanent—“the new normal.” Participants described adjusting household budgets, reducing spending, and becoming more cautious about financial decisions. And among those with stable employment, the feeling was not that they were struggling to survive, but that they were struggling to advance.
A common theme across interviews was that now—in 2026—it takes significantly more effort just to maintain the level of day-to-day stability they remember from the last Trump administration, a frustration participants began voicing as early as November of last year. Many described working more hours, cutting back on non-essentials, and budgeting more carefully, yet still feeling like they were treading water rather than getting ahead.
For participants, the problem was not always outright financial collapse, but a deeper sense of stagnation: even when they were managing to stay afloat, they no longer felt progress was possible. This perception—that hard work no longer leads to upward mobility—has fueled growing resentment not only toward Democrats, but increasingly toward Trump and Republicans as well, particularly among those who supported Trump expecting quick economic relief.
By the end of 2025 and into 2026, participants generally felt that Trump did not deliver on his central economic promise: lowering the cost of living. Importantly, many described giving him grace at first—assuming that inflation and high prices were inherited problems that would take time to fix. Several participants framed economic management as one of Trump’s core strengths, citing his background as a businessman and their memory of the pre-pandemic economy as evidence that he “knew what he was doing.” Early on, they were willing to be patient, expecting that affordability would improve once he “got settled” and started implementing his agenda.
But over time, that patience eroded as day-to-day expenses stayed high and participants saw little evidence that cost-of-living relief was being treated as an urgent priority. Some described a growing disconnect between Trump’s campaign messaging on affordability and what they perceived as the administration’s actual focus—spending political energy on immigration, cultural issues, or international conflicts while families continued struggling to keep up with basic costs. Prices—particularly for groceries, household staples, and everyday necessities—remained a persistent frustration, and participants increasingly talked about inflation not as a national statistic but as something they felt every time they went to the store.
In this sense, the longitudinal study reveals an important reversal: what drove participants away from Biden/Harris and toward Trump (or the couch) is now driving dissatisfaction with Trump and the broader Republican agenda.
Immigration: Border Focus Fades as Concerns About Overreach Grow
Participants’ views on immigration underwent a noticeable shift over the course of 2025. In 2025, many participants expressed frustration with border disorder and felt that Democrats had lost control of the border and were prioritizing the needs of newly arrived undocumented immigrants U.S. citizens or even other undocumented immigrants who had been in the U.S. for a long time. Border security concerns, resentment toward recent migrant arrivals, and a belief that the system was unfair to those who “did things the right way” were central to how participants justified defection—moving away from their prior Democratic alignment in vote choice, partisan identity, or both— or disengagement.
By late 2025 and into 2026, however, the focus of immigration conversations had shifted away from border management and toward fear of indiscriminate enforcement. While many participants still believed Trump had succeeded in restoring a sense of order at the border—and credited him with finally taking control—that reassurance was increasingly overshadowed by anxiety about how immigration enforcement was being carried out inside the country. Participants described growing discomfort with what they perceived as a more aggressive and punitive approach, including raids, detentions, and encounters that felt intimidating or violent rather than targeted and procedural.
Critically, participants felt there was a widening gap between who they believed Trump would go after and who they now saw being affected. Many had supported tougher enforcement under the assumption it would focus narrowly on “criminals,” recent arrivals, or individuals with serious offenses. Instead, participants increasingly believed enforcement was sweeping up ordinary people—long-settled immigrants, workers, parents, and community members who were not seen as threats. For some, the issue was no longer whether the border was secure, but whether the government was targeting the “right people,” and whether anyone in their community could be caught up in a system that felt indiscriminate.
This paradigm shift is significant: participants did not necessarily become more pro-immigrant in ideological terms, but they became more concerned about overreach, profiling, and the potential for violence and family separation.
Views of Trump, Republicans and Democrats: Performance Over Politics, and Growing Cynicism
Participants continued to describe their 2024 decisions as grounded in practical concerns rather than party loyalty. Many of them were first-time Trump voters or had previously voted for Biden, and they framed their choice as a response to immediate economic pressures—particularly affordability—rather than identity or ideology. That said, 5 out of 6 participants expressed that Trump’s performance had not yet aligned with what they had hoped for when casting their ballots.
A recurring perception across interviews was that Trump and Republicans have been focused on everything except lowering prices. Participants cited immigration crackdowns, conflicts abroad, and political spectacle as distractions from what they see as the core responsibility of the government: providing opportunities for working people. Participants kept coming back to the same complaint: Trump talks a lot about immigration and chaos overseas, but groceries and rent are still expensive.
At the same time, dissatisfaction with Trump has not translated into enthusiasm for Democrats. Participants’ criticisms of Democrats remained rooted in distrust, disappointment, and resentment over what they saw as a problem across the political system: leaders in both parties prioritizing politics and ideology over the daily pressures of working-class life. Even as some participants expressed regret about Trump, many still described Democrats as out of touch—too focused on ideology or cultural issues rather than the daily pressures of working-class life.
Taken together, these ethnographies suggest that many Latino voters are not undergoing a straightforward partisan shift, but rather deepening political cynicism—an outlook that mirrors what we have seen in recent polling and in the volatility of recent election results. Participants are increasingly skeptical that either party can—or will—deliver on the issues they care about most. But this cynicism is not translating into disengagement as much as fluidity: voters remain open to persuasion and willing to shift their support based on who they believe is competent, serious, and capable of follow-through. Economic dissatisfaction and immigration overreach are not simply policy critiques; they are becoming evidence points in a broader narrative that the government is not responsive to people like them.



