Latino State of Play: 2025 Elections and New Equis Polling

Survey conducted 10/15 – 10/29 via phones and text-to-web with 2000 registered voters who identify as Hispanic or Latino nationally. The sample included an oversample in the following pooled competitive congressional districts (all 10%+ Latino CVAP): CA-03, CA-09, CA-13, CA-22, CA-27, CA-40, CA-41, CA-45, CA-47, AZ- 01, AZ-06, NV-03, NM-02, CO-08, TX-28, TX-34, TX-35, TX-15, NJ-07, NJ-09, NY-03, NY-04, NY-17, PA-07, PA-08.

The national sample was weighted to match the composition of registered voters modeled as Latino by state, gender, age, education, and 2024 vote recall. The sample was also weighted by age, education, 2024 vote recall by gender, and geography, to match the composition of registered voters modeled as Latino in each state with a sample size of 175+ (CA, FL, TX), in the Mid-Atlantic region (DE, MD, PA, NJ, and NY) and the Southwest region (AZ, CO, NM, and NV).

Language of interview, place of origin, education and other variables were monitored during the fielding. The survey was conducted in English and Spanish, according to the respondent’s preference. MoE is ~2.0 % for the full sample, ~6.0% for FL, the Mid-Atlantic, and Southwest, ~5.0% for TX, and ~4.0% for CA.

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On November 4th, a year after Trump and Republicans made sizeable gains with Latino voters across the country, Democrats recovered some support among Latinos in key elections. The dissatisfaction Latino voters have expressed in polling throughout the year was not a mirage; it showed up at the ballot box. 

In the New Jersey governor's race, the first clean measure of Latino support since 2024, the vote in Hispanic-dense geographies resembled 2021 more than 2024. This is an early sign that the best comparison point for Latino support in the 2026 midterms may be 2022, not 2024: higher for Democrats than last year's GOP peak, but not yet a return to the Democratic highs prior to Biden.

In many ways, this was not surprising. For months, polling has shown Trump underwater among Latino voters, with some of his 2024 supporters expressing support for Democratic candidates in the midterms. This has remained steady over the past few months.

In a national Equis poll of 2,000 registered Latino voters, fielded October 15 to October 29, our second "Pulse Check" of the year, Trump’s approval rating among Latino voters remained at 36-59 (-23). Some 19% of his supporters expressed disappointment (14%) or outright regret (6%) for having voted for him and 13% of them expressed potential defection away from the Republican camp in 2026.

The administration’s overreach on immigration has been a clear driver of discontent for many Latino voters. Both in July and October polls, immigration enforcement policies such as work-place raids and allowing ICE agents to use masks and civilian clothes during arrests were some of Trump’s least popular policies among Hispanic voters. In the most recent poll, the majority of Latinos disagreed with deploying troops to cities to assist with immigration enforcement (62% disagree) and increasing work visa fees to reduce the number of immigrant workers (60%). 

But to chalk up Latino voters’ discontent to just immigration would ignore the reason why so many Latinos voted for him in the first place: concerns about the cost of living. Poll after poll, the economy ranks as the number one issue for Latino voters. And while the economy was a strength for Trump in 2024, it has turned into a weakness now: approval on the cost of living is 68-28 (-40), lower than any other issue listed in the poll including healthcare (-29), immigration (-24), and education (-22). This is especially true of those disappointed/regretful Latino Trump voters, 75% of whom disapprove of Trump’s handling of the cost of living. 

It is not just that these voters believe Trump has failed to deliver when it comes to affordability. They have also felt the impact of Trump’s tariffs: 68% report being impacted in some way – cutting back on groceries, delaying purchases, dipping into savings, or going into debt – since April, when tariffs on imported goods went into effect. 

Rejection of the Trump administration is not one-dimensional. Those who supported him a year ago and are now disappointed or regretful mention a mix of factors, including not improving the economy (17%), focusing on immigration over other issues (13%), targeting law-abiding immigrants (14%), and abusing his power (18%). 

When it comes to abuse of power, however, many Latinos have come to distrust the worst that is said about Trump. The result is a mix of genuine concern about Trump with skepticism of what the media and his critics say about him: 56% of Latinos believe he is acting like an authoritarian, but 49% believe the media/critics exaggerate to make him seem like a greater threat than he really is. Some 19% agree with both. Despite their own dissatisfaction with the President, the disappointed/regretful Latino voters are much more likely to believe that the media/critics are exaggerating (70%) – suggesting that there is continued risk of his opponents alienating key Latino swing voters with abstract rhetoric about abuses of power and authoritarianism, as opposed to focusing on voters’ lived experiences of the administration’s actions.

These experiences are shaping the discussions that Latino voters are having in their social circles. Ahead of the 2024 election a plurality of Latino voters (42%) reported that most people they interact with regularly – friends, family, co-workers – would vote for Trump over Harris, compared to 36% who said their networks mostly supported Harris. Now, the plurality (48%) of Latino voters say that the people around them mostly oppose President Trump, compared to just 22% who say the people around them mostly support the President. (The remainder say attitudes in their social networks are mixed.)

This dissatisfaction has created an opening for Democrats, which we saw them capitalize on last week. Democrats continue to hold a double digit lead over Republicans (54-36) among Latino voters in competitive congressional districts. Per Catalist estimates, Kamala Harris barely won Latinos in these districts in 2024, 51-49. The polling suggests Democrats start with a slightly higher baseline this cycle. 

However, this does not mean that Trump’s gains are entirely erased, or that the GOP can’t continue to show strength with Latinos. Nor are attitudes toward the Trump administration varying much month-to-month among Latino voters, in spite of new developments; partisanship still holds sway. Equis analysis shows that about 11% of Hispanic voters in those districts remain true swing voters and up to 30% remain open to persuasion. And perceptions of both parties have remained relatively stable since earlier in the year. 

Despite dissatisfaction with the Trump administration, Democrats have not managed to improve their favorability among Latinos (45 fav/45 unfav) in the past three months. And the Republican Party’s rating has remained relatively stable at 39/53. Both parties continue to have significant room for growth with Latino voters – especially when it comes to addressing the cost of living and fighting for hardworking Americans. 

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¹ It wasn’t just support; turnout in key geographies went up relative to 2021 as well. 

² Fielding was complete prior to SNAP delays and partial payments which began on November 1, 2025

³  Difference due to rounding

⁴  Q.34 “Trump is acting like an authoritarian leader who threatens American democracy.”

⁵  Q.35 “The media and critics exaggerate Trump's actions and make him seem like a greater threat than he really is.”

⁶ Source: Equis State Series Poll (Wave 8 / October 2024) | registered Latinos in AZ, CO, FL, GA, MI, NV, NM, NC, OH, PA, TX, and WI.

⁷ The survey included an oversample of the following pooled congressional districts: CA-03, CA-09, CA-13, CA-22, CA-27, CA-40, CA-41, CA-45, CA-47, AZ- 01, AZ-06, NV-03, NM-02, CO-08, TX-28, TX-34, TX-35, TX-15, NJ-07, NJ-09, NY-03, NY-04, NY-17, PA-07, PA-08. These are 2026 competitive districts where Latinos are at least 10% of the Citizen Voting Age Population. 

⁸ This segmentation is based on an index using the following in-poll measures: party ID, ideology, past presidential vote (2020, 2024), ticket splitting, party favorability, and perceptions of the parties’ core values.